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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
This case requires us to determine the minimum
conduct in which a defendant must engage in order to qualify
for a two-level enhancement pursuant to Sentencing
Guidelines § 3C1.2 (“§ 3C1.2”), for recklessly creating a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
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person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement
officer.
Defendant Dwayne Cespedes appeals the 144-month
sentence he received after pleading guilty to armed robbery
and related offenses. Specifically, Cespedes objects to the
District Court’s enhancement of his sentence for recklessly
endangering others while fleeing from law enforcement
officers pursuant to § 3C1.2 based purely upon his
participation in a conspiracy to commit armed robbery, when
he was merely a passenger in the car which was being driven
recklessly by his co-conspirator. Given the language of the
relevant guideline provisions, we agree with Cespedes and
will therefore remand for re-sentencing without the
enhancement.
I. Background
Cespedes and two confederates planned and executed
an armed robbery of the KNBT Bank in Whitehall,
Pennsylvania. Cespedes and one of his co-conspirators,
Michael Grant, entered the bank armed with guns, while the
other accomplice, Curtis Whitehurst, waited outside in a
getaway car.
While in the bank, Cespedes showed his weapon to the
bank’s teller, stating “it is what it is,” as Grant opened the
cash drawer and removed its contents. Cespedes then pointed
the weapon at the teller and gave her thirty seconds to tell
them where the rest of the bank’s money was located. The
robbers then removed more money from the bank safe before
exiting with $22,467 in cash.
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Cespedes and Grant then entered the getaway car
driven by Whitehurst. Rather than submit to an attempted
traffic stop, Whitehurst engaged police in a high speed chase
through residential neighborhoods that spanned two counties.
Eventually, Cespedes and Grant got out and fled on foot, after
which Whitehurst continued his reckless driving. Whitehurst
ignored traffic laws, running stop signs and traveling in the
wrong direction on certain roads. At one point during the
chase, Whitehurst nearly struck innocent bystanders walking
in a crosswalk. Eventually, Whitehurst collided with a parked
minivan before being struck by a police cruiser while
attempting to reverse.
Cespedes was apprehended after a short pursuit on
foot. A gun was recovered under a trash can lid in the
vicinity of where Cespedes fled. The bank teller later
positively identified him as the robber who pointed a gun at
her.
A grand jury returned a three-count indictment against
Cespedes, charging him with the following offenses:
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371; armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2113(d); and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Cespedes
pleaded guilty to all three counts.
Consistent with the recommendation in Cespedes’
Presentence Investigation Report, the District Court applied a
two-level enhancement for recklessly endangering others
while fleeing from law enforcement officers pursuant to §
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3C1.2. 1 The District Court rejected Cespedes’ objection that
the enhancement was improper because he never possessed
1

Section 3C1.2 provides: “If the defendant recklessly
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer, increase by 2 levels.”
With respect to the enhancement, the Presentence
Investigation Report focused upon Whitehurst’s conduct
during the high speed chase. The report contained the
following justification for the enhancement:
The defendants led Whitehall
Township Police Department on a
high speed chase through a
residential area of Whitehall,
Pennsylvania, and ending in
Allentown, Pennsylvania, during
mid-morning hours. During this
pursuit, Whitehurst ignored traffic
laws, running stop signs and
traveling in the wrong direction.
In one instance, Whitehurst
almost struck innocent bystanders
crossing the road in the crosswalk.
Whitehurst crashed the getaway
vehicle into a parked minivan and,
while attempting to reverse the
vehicle, was struck by a police
cruiser. This reckless conduct
created a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to both
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any control over the recklessly driven getaway vehicle, and
had exited on account of Whitehurst’s erratic driving. During
the sentencing hearing, the District Court reasoned as follows:
There was a violation of traffic
control devices before Mr.
Cespedes got out. So, he may not
have been in the car for the entire
chase, but he certainly was there
for part of it, and the chase really
was a chase in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and he is a
conspirator. . . . I understand that
he wasn’t driving the car, but he’s
complicit in that.
He’s as
responsible as Mr. Whitehurst is
because he is a co-conspirator.
J.A. 85-86. Application of the enhancement raised the
Guidelines range for Cespedes’ robbery counts from 41-51
months to 51-63 months. When added to the mandatory 84month sentence for Cespedes’ firearm count, the
enhancement resulted in a final Guidelines range of 135-147
months. The District Court ultimately sentenced Cespedes to
the law enforcement personnel
involving the pursuit, as well as
innocent (sic) bystanders along
the route. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3C1.2, two levels are added to the
offense level.
PSR ¶ 22.
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144 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years’
supervised release.
The instant appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
“When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court must
ensure that the district court ‘committed no significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Aquino,
555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “We review the District
Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo,
and scrutinize any findings of fact for clear error.” Id.
(internal citations omitted).
III. Discussion
Cespedes presents a two-step argument as to why the
District Court erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to §
3C1.2. First, Cespedes argues that the general conduct
provision
in
Guidelines
§
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
(“§
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)”), which permits sentences to be enhanced
based upon the reasonably foreseeable acts of others, does not
apply to § 3C1.2. Second, Cespedes argues that Application
Note 5 (“Note 5”) to § 3C1.2 required the Government to
prove that he “aided[,] abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused” Whitehurst’s reckless
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driving, which it failed to do. We will consider each of these
arguments in turn.
A.
As a general matter, the Sentencing Guidelines permit
a defendant’s sentence to be enhanced based not only upon
his own conduct, but also upon the conduct of his criminal
confederates. Specifically, § 1B1.3(a) states:
Unless otherwise specified, . . .
adjustments in Chapter Three . . .
shall be determined on the basis
of the following: (1)(A) all acts
and omissions committed, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant; and (B)
in the case of a jointly undertaken
criminal activity (a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in
concert with others, whether or
not charged as a conspiracy), all
reasonably foreseeable acts and
omissions of others in furtherance
of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense[.]
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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added). By including the
phrase “unless otherwise specified,” the relevant conduct
provision admits of exceptions to application of §
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s reasonable foreseeability test in certain
instances. Cespedes contends that § 3C1.2 is one such
instance.
Pursuant to § 3C1.2, a defendant’s sentence can be
increased two levels “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement
officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Note 5 to § 3C1.2 provides the
following commentary:
Under this section, the defendant
is accountable for the defendant’s
own conduct and for conduct that
the defendant aided or abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused.
Id. at cmt. n.5 (emphasis added). The question, then, is
whether, by specifically describing when a defendant can be
held responsible for reckless endangerment caused by another
during flight based upon something other than reasonable
foreseeability, § 3C1.2 “specifies otherwise” such that §
1B1.3(a)(1)(B) does not apply.
Note 5 makes clear that, to qualify for an enhancement
under § 3C1.2, a defendant must have either himself
recklessly endangered others, or “aided[,] abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused”
another’s reckless endangerment of others. It therefore
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specifically describes the conduct that will render a defendant
responsible for another’s recklessness during flight from law
enforcement. See United States v. Chong, 285 F.3d 343, 346
(4th Cir. 2002). Although set forth in commentary to §
3C1.2, we must consider Note 5 authoritative “unless it
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Id. at
345-46 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38
(1993)). Application of a § 3C1.2 enhancement based upon
the reasonable foreseeability of a confederate’s reckless
endangerment during flight – using the generally applicable
standard of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) – runs afoul of Note 5’s
limitation by enhancing a defendant’s sentencing without him
having engaged in the specific conduct set forth with respect
to the reckless endangerment. 2
2

Further militating in favor of our interpretation is the
companion sub-section of § 1B1.3(a)(1).
Section
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) allows enhancements to be “determined on
the basis of . . . all acts and omissions committed, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant.”
U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Absent Note 5, then, a
defendant’s sentence could still be enhanced pursuant to §
3C1.2 if he “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused” an accomplice’s reckless
endangerment of others during flight. Note 5 would therefore
be unnecessary if not meant to cabin the circumstances in
which a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced based upon
the recklessness of another by preventing application of §
1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The contrary interpretation urged by the
Government – that Note 5 was included in § 3C1.2 merely for
emphasis and not for any substantive purpose – would render
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Accordingly, we join all of our sister circuit courts of
appeals that have considered this issue in reasoning that
“some form of direct or active participation which is
consistent with . . . Note [5] is necessary in order for § 3C1.2
to apply.” United v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir.
1999); see also Chong, 285 F.3d at 346; United States v.
Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 1995).
“Thus, in the case of a defendant who was a passenger during
a flight from police, a district court ‘must specify in the
record its reasons for holding [that defendant] responsible for
the driver’s conduct.’” United States v. Wilfong, 475 F.3d

Note 5 a mere nullity. See United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d
1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999).
The Government contends that Illustration (b)(1) to §
1B1.3 supports finding that § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies to the
reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement.
The
illustration makes a getaway driver in an armed bank robbery
accountable for injuries caused by his co-conspirators during
the robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2. The Government
suggests that “it would be anomalous to hold a participant in a
robbery liable for an accomplice’s assault on a teller, but
create a different rule for an accomplice’s reckless
endangerment of others during flight, which poses exactly the
same danger of bodily injury to innocent persons.” Appellee
Br. at 17. We disagree. The illustration merely demonstrates
how the reasonable foreseeability analysis operates when the
relevant conduct provision in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies. It is
not at all instructive with respect to the predicate question of
which enhancements § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) applies to, which is the
issue here considered. See Cook, 181 F.3d at 1236 n.1.
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1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Young, 33 F.3d 31, 33 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Here, the District Court relied upon Cespedes’
participation in a conspiracy with the reckless getaway driver
to enhance his sentence pursuant to § 3C1.2, stating, “He’s as
responsible as Mr. Whitehurst is because he is a coconspirator.” J.A. 86. The conclusion that a § 3C1.2
enhancement is proper based solely upon a defendant’s entry
into a conspiracy is inadequate because it does not indicate
how that defendant “aided[,] abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused” the recklessness upon
which the enhancement is predicated. See Lipsey, 62 F.3d at
1136 (deeming the “community of interest among all three
defendants in the car to escape” insufficient to justify
application of § 3C1.2).
In effect, the District Court enhanced Cespedes’
sentence based upon the mere foreseeability of Whitehurst’s
reckless driving. 3 Pursuant to Note 5, though, the fact that the
reckless driving may have been reasonably foreseeable is not
determinative. Therefore, the basis upon which the District
Court applied § 3C1.2 to Cespedes’ sentence was insufficient
as a matter of law.
B.
The Government urges that evidence introduced
against Cespedes, along with findings in unrelated portions of
the sentencing record, suggest that the District Court properly
3

Indeed, the Government acknowledges in its brief
that “part of the district court’s remarks focused on the
reasonable foreseeability test.” Appellee Br. at 18.
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applied § 3C1.2, even in light of Note 5. However, our
consideration of the record as a whole demonstrates that
Cespedes’ conduct did not qualify him for the recklessendangerment-during-flight enhancement, as interpreted
above.
The proof to which the Government points as
demonstrating that Cespedes was
responsible for
Whitehurst’s recklessness primarily relates to the level of
planning involved in his offense. The only evidence specific
to Cespedes’ role in planning the crime was that he learned
when best to commit the robbery from a former bank
employee with whom he was acquainted. J.A. 113. That by
itself, however, is inadequate to justify a § 3C1.2
enhancement because it does not relate at all to Cespedes’
responsibility for Whitehurst’s recklessness during the
getaway. Indeed, the only proof as to how the conspirators
prepared for the getaway made clear that Whitehurst obtained
the vehicle used to flee the scene from a friend who rented it
several days before the robbery. PSR ¶ 11. Cespedes’ role in
planning the robbery, without more, does not render him
accountable for the reckless endangerment of others caused
by Whitehurst’s reckless driving.
Observations made by the District Court, which the
Government argues further support upholding application of
the enhancement to Cespedes, suffer from a similar infirmity
and do nothing to bolster its position. The District Court
explained its determination that Cespedes’ offense was
particularly disturbing by emphasizing “the circumstances
before in planning this, getting the guns, [and] getting the
car,” as well as the “foot pursuit” that occurred after Cespedes
“asked to get out of the car.” J.A. 113-114. Again, though,
these findings do not demonstrate anything about Cespedes’
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conduct that would show that he “aided[,] abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused”
Whitehurst’s reckless endangerment of others during flight
from the police. Since there is no evidence of any such
conduct here, the enhancement does not apply by its terms.
Proof indicating only that conspirators collectively
planned a robbery that led to a high speed chase is inadequate
to qualify each passenger in the getaway vehicle for a
reckless-endangerment-during-flight enhancement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding that inclusion of getaway cars as part of
robbery plan does not demonstrate a defendant’s
responsibility for reckless endangerment).
Therefore,
because the evidence and findings as to Cespedes’
involvement in the reckless getaway lacked specificity as to
what rendered him responsible for Whitehurst’s reckless
driving, we hold that the Government did not satisfy its
burden of proving him subject to § 3C1.2, i.e., it did not show
that Cespedes’ conduct constituted a “form of direct or active
participation which is consistent with . . . Note [5].” Cook,
181 F.3d at 1235.
“[W]here the government has the burden of production
and persuasion as it does on issues like enhancement of the
offense level . . . , its case should ordinarily have to stand or
fall on the record it makes the first time around [and it]
should not normally be afforded a second bite at the apple.”
United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 (3d Cir. 1995)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
our conclusion prohibits application of the recklessendangerment-during-flight enhancement to Cespedes’
sentence upon resentencing by the District Court.
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IV. Conclusion
In sum, the evidence and the form of the District
Court’s findings make it evident that Cespedes’ sentence was
erroneously enhanced pursuant to § 3C1.2. We therefore
vacate the sentence and remand to the District Court for
resentencing without the enhancement.
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